“Delay always breeds danger; and to protract a great design is often to ruin it.” (Cervantes). In the recent case of TBO Investments Limited v Mohun-Smith [2016] EWCA Civ 403 the Court of Appeal handed down some helpful guidance on the application of the ubiquitous test of promptness. The decision is also important for its accompanying examination of the ‘good reason’ for not attending trial requirement contained in CPR r. 39.3(5)(b) and that element of it will be examined in a subsequent article. The facts of the case are far from straightforward. TBO was the Defendant to a £2.1M claim by two investors in respect of the provision of allegedly negligent investment advice. The trial was event
One of the more interesting and entertaining decisions this month was that of Lord Dyson, Master of the Rolls, in Harb v HRH Prince Abdul Aziz Bin Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz. Essentially, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of Peter Smith J sitting in the Chancery Division, on the basis of the Court’s criticism of his approach to the evidence at trial. Certainly the appellate judgment included some important observations about evidence and how it should be considered in judgments. The case will no doubt attract attention, however, for other observations concerning judicial bias and the facts behind those allegations. The Facts This was a dispute about the ownership of two doubtless lovely p
Most agree that leaving the EU would entail a negotiating period of at least two years, as set out in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. But, argue Frank Vibert and Gunnar Beck, this is not a certainty. If a Brexit vote – combined with a Commons majority in favour of Leave – were deemed to constitute ‘a fundamental change of circumstances’ under the UN’s Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties, Britain could leave the EU immediately. They set out a timetable that would see Britain leave the EU within a week. To see the full article on this debate, please click here
